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WHAT HAPPENS TO A DREAM DEFERRED? :
CLEANSING THE TAINT OF
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. RODRIGUEZ
1

IAN MILLHISER
INTRODUCTION
Half a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized the crucial
role of public education in opening the doors of opportunity to all
Americans.2 In its famous decision declaring school segregation
unconstitutional, the Court proclaimed that “it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education,”3 and yet that same Court, repopulated
4
by the fruits of President Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,”
5
turned its back on education just nineteen years later.

Copyright © 2005 by Ian Millhiser.
1. Langston Hughes, Harlem (Montage of a Dream Deferred), in THE COLLECTED POEMS
OF LANGSTON HUGHES 426 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1994)
(1951).
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is . . . . a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”).
3. Id.
4. The “Southern Strategy” refers to a Republican campaign strategy to appeal to
conservative white voters through a thinly veiled message of anti-black racism. Angela P.
Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1923, 2000 (2000).
For an insider’s view of President Nixon’s battle to stack the Court with opponents of civil
rights, see generally JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE (2001). One of then-Assistant
Attorney General William Rehnquist’s first assignments at the Department of Justice was to
provide legal advice to the White House’s successful campaign to intimidate liberal Justice Abe
Fortas into retirement. Id. at 4–12. In replacing Fortas and other departing Justices, Nixon
actively sought “strict constructionist” judges, described by Rehnquist as those who “will
generally not be favorably inclined toward claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights
plaintiffs.” Id. at 16.
5. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (refusing to recognize
a fundamental right to education). All four of President Nixon’s appointees, Chief Justice
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
Court upheld a public education funding system in Texas that
provided fewer funds per student in poorer school districts than in
7
wealthier ones. In reaching this decision, the Court announced a twopart holding: first, that poverty is not a suspect class entitled to strict
scrutiny in discrimination cases,8 and second, that education is not a
9
fundamental right for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
Rodriguez is significant for its devastating impact on low income
children, but it is equally significant because of the philosophical shift
it marked in the Court’s jurisprudence.
The Rodriguez decision foreshadowed a turning point in
American law. Prior to this decision, the Warren-era Justices were
willing to cure social injustices poorly addressed by the political
branches through broad equitable relief. With four Nixon-appointed
Justices, however, the Court not only began to defer to the legislature
but also began to view its role as increasingly limited, even when it
conceded that a constitutional violation had occurred. As this Note
will discuss, this trend was exacerbated as Justices appointed by
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush came to dominate
the Court.
This Note has two purposes. First, it offers a progressive
constitutional framework that includes a fundamental, affirmative
right to an adequate education. Second—and just as significantly—it
explains why the conservative doctrine of “judicial restraint” leaves
undereducated Americans without recourse to any branch of
government. This Note will argue that judicial deference to state
legislatures is inappropriate when such deference necessarily results
in continued constitutional violations.
Part I argues that the legislative branch is structurally unfit to
provide educational civil rights and asserts that an affirmative right to
an adequate education can only come from the courts. Part II
considers the judiciary’s ability to provide a meaningful remedy in
educational civil rights cases. Part II concludes that the ‘Far Right’s
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun, voted to deny relief in Rodriguez. Of the
pre-Nixon members of the Court, only Justice Stewart joined the majority.
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
7. Id. at 58–59.
8. Id. at 29.
9. See id. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected.”).
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10
cries for “judicial self-restraint” should be ignored when such
restraint allows continuing constitutional violations to occur. Part III
constructs a progressive method of constitutional interpretation that
allows the courts to meet a changing society with appropriately
expanded rights, while at the same time providing a limiting principle
to prevent judges from injecting their personal opinions into the law.
Under this method, an affirmative constitutional duty is imposed on
the states whenever that duty is necessary to preserve a preexisting
constitutional right. Part IV examines the constitutional right to vote
and argues that a baseline education is necessary to uphold this
preexisting right. Finally, Part V proposes seeking guidance from
state curricula and assessments in defining the scope of a fundamental
right to an adequate education.

I. THE NEED FOR A JUDICIAL REMEDY
The central insight of Rodriguez is that “the Justices of this
Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems
so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues.”11 Such a presumption of
judicial incompetence is not to be abandoned lightly, lest the Court
12
relive the shameful history of Lochner v. New York. But Lochner’s
folly was not “judicial activism,” as so many conservative revisionists
assert.13 Lochner’s folly, in the words of the decision that ended its
reign, was allowing the “exploitation of a class . . . who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus
relatively defenseless . . . .”14 Under Lochner, the weakest Americans
were left without a single branch of government from which to seek
redress. The judiciary was quite clearly their enemy, and the

10. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1221
(1993).
11. 411 U.S. at 41.
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner held that labor protections such as maximum hour laws
were subject to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 56. This opinion is now almost
universally viewed as “unprincipled judicial overreaching” into an area beyond the judiciary’s
competence. Neal Devins, The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing Emperors and
Searching for Constitutional Truth, 85 GEO. L.J. 691, 693 (1997).
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874–76 (1978)
(criticizing Lochner not for “activism” but instead for forbidding the legislature to alter the
“existing distribution of wealth and entitlements”).
14. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); see also Sunstein, supra note
13, at 876 (quoting same).
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majoritarian branches were forbidden from acting by that very
enemy.
No system of government is legitimate that leaves a class of
citizens unable “to petition the Government for a redress of
15
grievances.” This right to seek such redress is among the protected
16
privileges and immunities long recognized by the Supreme Court,
and yet by reserving to the legislature what properly belongs to the
judiciary, the Court since Rodriguez has denied underprivileged
Americans their most basic right to seek redress. If the right to seek
redress is truly a fundamental constitutional right, then every
American must be able to seek relief in some branch of government.
Accordingly, if legislatures are structurally incapable of providing
meaningful relief, then another branch must possess the power to act.
This is not to say, of course, that the judiciary must grant relief in
areas in which the legislature cannot act, merely that it is improper
for the judiciary to plead institutional incompetence in an area in
which the elected braches are even less competent.
As this Part argues, legislatures are structurally incapable of
providing an adequate education to the millions of Americans kept in
ignorance by underfunded school districts. Section A explains why
local legislatures are ill-suited to provide relief to the poor and
undereducated. Section B then explores the proper role of the courts
in the face of a reluctant state legislature.
It is also important to note what this Part will not discuss.
Although this Note does argue that a fundamental right to an
adequate education is implicit in the Due Process Clause, that
discussion will be deferred until Parts III and IV. This first Part is
concerned with a far narrower point: deference to the legislature, in
and of itself, is insufficient reason to deny a constitutional right. As an
alternative theory, this Part will propose that judicial deference
should be the rule when the political process can effectively provide
relief to aggrieved citizens, but that when the legislature is
structurally unable to provide such relief, deference for its own sake is
inappropriate.

15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (listing, as among the
“Privileges and Immunities” of citizenship, the rights “‘to come to the seat of government to
assert any claim . . . upon that government, to transact any business . . . with it, [and] to seek its
protection’”) (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867)).
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A. Local Funding and the Wrongness of Rodriguez
The Fourteenth Amendment plays a special role in ensuring the
integrity of the political process. The Equal Protection Clause has
long been understood to protect “discrete and insular minorities”
against the vagaries of the political process.17 Similarly, both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses have long been
interpreted to forbid laws passed “without reference to [some
independent] considerations in the public interest.”18 The mere fact
that a law is blessed by the majoritarian process is never sufficient to
19
render that law constitutional.
Conservatives have long claimed that a broad interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a judicial subversion of the democratic
20
process. But even the (conservative) Rodriguez Court conceded that
the judiciary has a special role in protecting those “relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.”21 The Fourteenth
Amendment is intended not to subvert, but to bolster, the democratic
process against governmental structures that “curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
22
minorities . . . .” As Professor Bruce Ackerman explains, Lochner
was illegitimate because it protected those who “enjoyed ample
opportunity to safeguard their own interests through the political

17. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
18. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973); see also Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (forbidding laws that exist for the sole purpose of harming a particular
group).
19. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 50
(1985) (“In no modern case has the Court recognized the legitimacy of pluralist compromise as
the exclusive basis for legislation.”).
20. See, e.g., Declaration of Constitutional Principles, 102 CONG. REC. 4460, 4515–16 (1956)
(statement of Sen. Walter F. George, widely known as “The Southern Manifesto”) (“[T]he
decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases [is] a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes
a trend in the Federal Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”); Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 39–
40 (1997) (arguing that the common law method of interpreting law is “not the way of
construing a democratically adopted text”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Draft Article on Judicial
Restraint (1981), http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/doc006.pdf
(“A second means by which courts arrogate to themselves functions reserved to the legislative
branch or the states is through so-called ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘suspect class’ analyses, both
of which invite broad judicial scrutiny of the essentially legislative task of classification.”).
21. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
22. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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23
The modern understanding of the Fourteenth
process.”
Amendment, however, “accord[s] special protection to those who
ha[ve] been deprived of their fair share of political influence.”24 In
these cases, a “judicial conclusion that a fair democratic process
would have generated outcomes systematically more favorable” to
those without influence is warranted.25
Of course, not every minority is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but rather only those minorities who find it “especially
difficult . . . to strike bargains with potential coalition partners.”26 In a
pluralistic system, minorities are able to participate in the political
process by finding allies outside of their discrete group. These may be
natural allies, as when African American and Latino voters unite in
support of affirmative action, or they may be more uneasy alliances,
such as social conservatives and libertarians joining forces to elect a
president who will ban gay marriage and cut taxes, but such alliances
are an integral part of a pluralistic system.
The system of local school funding challenged in Rodriguez is
exactly the sort of “political process” against which the Fourteenth
Amendment is designed to offer protection. Under that system,
school districts depend on local property taxes to fund their
27
programs. Districts in wealthy areas receive a windfall, as they draw
their funding from a substantial tax base; districts in poorer areas are
28
left out in the cold. Additionally, poorer districts operating under
this or similar systems almost always tax their residents at a higher
rate to make up for the revenue shortfall, but these higher property
taxes are rarely sufficient to bridge the wealth chasm.29

23. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 715–16.
26. Id. at 720. Ackerman’s essay goes on to critique this pluralist understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment as insufficient to preserve civil rights in the modern era, but he
concedes that this understanding is the “first insight” of the Carolene Products decision and the
cases stemming from it. Id. at 740.
27. 411 U.S. at 10.
28. For an excellent discussion of this problem of school funding, see generally JOHN E.
COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 38–199 (1970).
29. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 75–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he poorest districts tend
to have the highest tax rates and the richest districts . . . the lowest tax rates. Yet, despite the
apparent extra effort being made by the poorest districts, they are unable even to begin to match
the richest districts in terms of the production of local revenues.”); COONS, supra note 28, at 50
(explaining that the problem of poorer districts carrying higher tax burdens and yet receiving
fewer funds existed for decades before the Rodriguez decision).
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It is this insurmountable chasm that reflects the invidiousness of
the local funding system. Residents of poorer districts want adequate
funding for their children’s schools. They vote for greater funding for
those schools, and they even agree to higher local taxes to pay for
those schools. Yet, the political process gives them no recourse. So
long as this localized funding is maintained, residents of poorer
districts will be unable to “safeguard their own interest through the
political process.”30 It is exactly this kind of powerlessness that the
Fourteenth Amendment is intended to prevent.
Of course, just because localized funding prevents recourse to a
local legislature does not mean that a judicial remedy is mandated by
the Constitution. As previously discussed, the Constitution only
requires that citizens be able to seek meaningful redress from some
branch of government;31 proving that local legislatures are
incompetent to provide an adequate education does not preclude
seeking relief from the state legislature. As the next Section will
discuss, however, state legislatures are no better suited to provide the
poor with an adequate education than are local legislatures.
B. State Legislatures and the Problem of Legislature Capture
A legislator who is “not primarily interested in reelection will not
achieve reelection as often as [one] who [is so] interested.”32 As a
result, the primary goal of an elected legislator is most often
reelection, lest that legislator risk becoming the victim of electoral
Darwinism. This reality is neither surprising nor inappropriate, as
electoral accountability is one of the principal advantages of a
democracy,33 but this advantage does not come without a price. In a
society with limited resources, each voter wants the biggest piece of
the pie, and so the American democracy rewards those legislators
who can deliver the greatest benefits to their constituents, often at the

30. Ackerman, supra note 23, at 715.
31. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
32. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
39–40 (1977).
33. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 352 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining that the purpose of “frequent elections” is “to support in the members [of Congress]
an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people”); see also Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 706 (1990) (“Though our era may not be alone in
deploring the lack of mechanisms for holding candidates accountable for the votes they cast,
that lack of accountability is one of the major concerns of our time.”).
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34
expense of voters in other districts. Because of this motivation on
the part of legislators, the minority of the electorate who reside in
poorer districts with less-educated residents are often the victims of
an electoral process that encourages elected officials to favor their
own district above all others.
To make matters worse, many of the voters in these districts are
constructively disenfranchised by their inadequate education.
According to the United States Census Bureau, college graduates are
nearly one and one-half times as likely to vote as high school
graduates and more than twice as likely to vote as Americans with
35
eight or fewer years of education. Furthermore, even if lesseducated Americans do cast ballots, they often lack the basic reading
skills and civic knowledge necessary to understand just what it is they
are voting for.36 So it should come as no surprise that the political
branches have proved just as inadequate in providing a baseline

34. See FIORINA, supra note 32, at 40 (“Each of us favors an arrangement in which our
fellow citizens pay for our benefits.”).
35. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 290
(2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec08.pdf. The Census Bureau
provides the following data on the correlation between education levels and voter turnout:
Percentage of Citizens Reporting They Voted, by Year
School Years Completed

1980

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Eight Years or Less

42.6

32.7

36.7

27.7

35.1

23.2

28.1

24.6

Some High School

45.6

33.8

41.3

30.9

41.2

27.0

33.8

25.0

Completed High School

58.9

44.1

54.7

42.2

57.5

40.5

49.1

37.1

Three Years of College
or Less

67.2

49.9

64.5

50.0

68.7

49.1

60.5

46.2

Four Years of College
or More

79.9

62.5

77.6

62.5

81.0

63.1

73.0

57.2

It is possible to read this chart as merely demonstrating increased apathy among less-educated
voters and thus to dismiss this problem as less-educated voters simply waiving their right to
vote. Even if this is the case, given the intimate connection between education and the ability to
intelligently exercise the franchise discussed in Part IV, infra, the state should still be held
accountable for a system that encourages voters in one school district to waive their rights, while
encouraging the opposite in other districts. See infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text
(explaining how modern voting rights jurisprudence protects against laws which create obstacles
to the lawful exercise of the franchise).
36. See infra Part IV (explaining why an adequate education is a necessary prerequisite to
the fundamental right to vote).
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education to both rich and poor Americans as they were in combating
37
Jim Crow segregation.
Dissenting in Rodriguez, Justice Marshall highlighted the futility
of seeking a state legislative solution to educational inequities:
The District Court in this case postponed decision for some two
years in the hope that the Texas Legislature would remedy the gross
disparities in treatment inherent in the Texas financing scheme. It
was only after the legislature failed to act in its 1971 Regular Session
that the District Court, apparently recognizing the lack of hope for
38
self-initiated legislative reform, rendered its decision.

This “lack of hope” has been borne out by numerous instances of
states willing to address pressing educational needs only when held at
39
knifepoint by an active judiciary.
At least nineteen state supreme courts have parted ways with
Rodriguez, holding either that their state constitution requires equal
education funding, or that their state system fails to provide an
40
adequate education. Although these state-level suits more often fail

37. See Chas. H. Thompson, Court Action the Only Reasonable Alternative to Remedy
Immediate Abuses of the Negro Separate School, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 419, 422 (1935) (“[I]t is no
longer a question of whether Negroes should resort to the courts as a means of removing
present abuses. They must resort to the courts. They have no other reasonable, legitimate
alternative.”); see also Thurgood Marshall, The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights, in
THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND
REMINISCENCES 90, 95 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001). Justice Marshall viewed the United States
Supreme Court as a unique bulwark against racism:
The threats of many of the bigots in the South to disregard the ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the recent Texas Primary decision has not intimidated a
single person. . . . Election officials in states affected by this decision will either let
Negroes vote in the Democratic Primaries, or they will be subjected to both criminal
and civil prosecution . . . .
Id. For an account of the NAACP’s legal strategy, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987).
38. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 n.2 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2003) (“Desegregation will not occur
without judicial action . . . .”).
39. See infra Part II.B (advocating the need for an active judiciary as a weapon against
reluctant legislatures); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1600 (“[D]esegregation lacks
sufficient national and local political support for elected officials to remedy the problem.”).
40. See, e.g., Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala.
Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338,
624 So. 2d 107, 110–11 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]he system of public schools fails to provide equitable
and adequate educational opportunities to all schoolchildren . . . .”); Roosevelt Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994) (“[T]he Arizona Constitution requires the
legislature to enact appropriate laws to finance education in the public schools in a way that
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41
than succeed, they have become the primary vehicle for challenging
educational inadequacy. They demonstrate the massive resistance
that state legislatures are willing to exert when faced with a
constitutional mandate to provide an adequate education. As Justice
Pfeifer explained in an Ohio Supreme Court opinion overturning that
state’s school funding system, “[t]he General Assembly has long been
aware that the current funding structure is constitutionally flawed. It
has been impossible to adequately address the problem because
wealthy school districts have staunchly defended the status quo. This
decision rejects the status quo and requires the General Assembly to
act.”42
As an examination of one state’s struggle with educational
adequacy reveals, however, state courts often believe they have
required a legislature to act, only to find that their decision has been
ignored. The state of Arkansas’s struggle with educational civil rights

does not itself create substantial disparities among schools, communities or districts.”); DuPree
v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (“[T]he educational opportunity of the
children in this state should not be controlled by the fortuitous circumstance of residence . . . .”);
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (“[F]or purposes of assessing our
state public school financing system in light of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws (1) discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district
wealth involves a suspect classification, and (2) education is a fundamental interest.”); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“[W]e have, by this decision,
declared the system of common schools in Kentucky to be unconstitutional . . . .”); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997) (“In this appeal we hold that the
present system of financing elementary and secondary public education in New Hampshire is
unconstitutional.”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 498
(Tex. 1991) (“[W]e therefore hold as a matter of law that the public school finance system
continues to violate article VII, section 1 of the Constitution.”); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,
386 (Vt. 1997) (per curiam) (“[T]he current system for funding public education in Vermont,
with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in
revenues available to local school districts, deprives children of an equal educational
opportunity in violation of the Vermont Constitution.”).
41. See Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A Comparative
Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6 (2002) (noting that although Rodriguez-style suits
have been brought in at least forty-three different states, only nineteen state courts have ruled
in the plaintiffs’ favor).
42. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 781 (Ohio 1997) (Pfeifer, J., concurring); see also
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 132 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“The Court’s suggestions of legislative redress and experimentation will doubtless be of great
comfort to the schoolchildren of Texas’ disadvantaged districts, but considering the vested
interests of wealthy school districts in the preservation of the status quo, they are worth little
more.”).
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43
began in 1983 with DuPree v. Alma School District No. 30. In
DuPree, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that the state’s
educational funding system bore “no rational relationship to the
educational needs of the individual districts” and held that there was
no “legitimate state purpose to support the system.”44 The court in
DuPree found that the highest and lowest revenues per pupil in
Arkansas’s school districts were $2,378 and $873, respectively, and
that the difference at the 95th and 5th percentiles was $1,576 and
$937.45 It blamed this disparity on the gap in property wealth, which
ranged from an average of $73,773 to an average of $1,853 per
46
taxpayer.
Concurring in DuPree, Justice Hickman offered a prescient
warning to the state legislature:

Equality is, of course, mostly an ideal or goal, and hardly ever a
reality in government. Reasons are always given for not requiring
equality but they are usually no more than excuses, and I do not
hesitate to point out that if the Arkansas legislature approaches its
new task with anything less than the goal of equality in dispensing
state funds, it risks repeating the same mistakes that brought about
47
this situation.

The Arkansas legislature did not heed this warning, and so the
Arkansas courts were forced to consider this issue again more than a
48
decade later.
In the 2000 case, Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee
49
(Lake View II), the Arkansas Supreme Court once again found gross
disparities in funding between wealthy and poor districts. Citing
43. 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). For a helpful summary of Rodriguez-type litigation in
Arkansas, see generally David R. Matthews, Lessons From Lake View: Some Questions and
Answers from Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 56 ARK. L. REV. 519 (2003).
44. 651 S.W.2d at 93.
45. Id. at 92.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 96 (Hickman, J., concurring).
48. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III), 91 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Ark.
2002) (“On November 9, 1994, then-chancery judge Annabelle Clinton Imber found that the
school-funding system did not violate the United States Constitution, but that it did violate the
Education Article (Article 14, § 1) and the Equality provisions (Article 2, §§ 2, 3, and 18) of the
Arkansas Constitution.”). Judge (now Justice) Imber’s original opinion is unpublished.
49. 10 S.W.3d 892 (Ark. 2000). Lake View I was a 1996 Arkansas Supreme Court decision
dismissing an appeal for lack of a final judgment. See Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917
S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ark. 1996) (dismissing an appeal from the Pulaski County Chancery Court for
lack of a final order).
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numbers similar to those in DuPree, the court in Lake View II found
that the wealthiest Arkansas school districts were spending almost
50
twice as much per pupil as the poorest districts. Two years later, in
51
Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III), the
court once again held that the Arkansas education system violated
the state’s constitution.52 In so holding, the court looked beyond mere
numbers to see the tangible costs of unequal funding: poorer districts
languished under a “barebones” curriculum, while the wealthiest
districts offered courses such as “German, fashion merchandising, and
53
marketing.” Furthermore, even such basic necessities as “rainproof
buildings, sufficient bathrooms, computers for its students, and
laboratory equipment that function[ed]” were often lacking in the
54
poorest districts. Nineteen years after the Arkansas Supreme
Court’s holding in DuPree, the state legislature had done practically
nothing to correct a constitutional violation.
Despite the legislature’s recalcitrance, the court in Lake View III
stayed its decision until January 1, 2004, to give “the General
Assembly an opportunity to meet in General Session and the
Department of Education time to implement appropriate changes.”55
Now faced with the real possibility of a mandatory injunction
56
requiring the state treasurer to fund education adequately, the
Arkansas legislature finally took action to obey its state’s
constitution. In 2004, more than two decades after its decision in
DuPree, a divided 4–3 court released jurisdiction over the Lake View

50. See 10 S.W.3d at 894 (“[D]isparities in per pupil expenditures in the 1992/93 school year
ranged from $4,064 spent per pupil in the Little Rock School District to $2,270 spent per pupil
in the Mountain View School District.”).
51. 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002).
52. See id. at 495 (“[T]he State has not fulfilled its constitutional duty to provide the
children of this state with a general, suitable, and efficient school-funding system. Accordingly,
we hold that the current school-funding system violates the Education Article of the Arkansas
Constitution . . . .”). The court’s holding in Lake View III went beyond that of their holding in
DuPree. Although DuPree merely held that public school students have an equal protection
right to equal funding regardless of district, 651 S.W.2d at 93, Lake View III held both that “the
current school-funding system violates the equal-protection sections of the Arkansas
Constitution,” 91 S.W.3d at 500, and that “the State has an absolute duty under our constitution
to provide an adequate education to each school child,” id. at 495.
53. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 497.
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id. at 511.
56. See Matthews, supra note 43, at 540 (“A mandatory injunction ordering the State
Treasurer to ‘adequately’ fund the education system seems a likely prospective remedy.”).
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57
matter. Although the majority cited “laudable” progress in areas
such as “accounting and accountability,”58 it also issued a stern
warning to the state legislature:

The resolve of this court is clear. We will not waver in our
commitment to the goal of an adequate and substantially equal
education for all Arkansas students; nor will we waver from the
constitutional requirement that our State is to ever maintain a
general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools. Make
no mistake, this court will exercise the power and authority of the
judiciary at any time to assure that the students of our State will not
fall short of the goal set forth by this court. We will assure its
59
attainment.

In dissent, Justice Corbin went even further, declaring a total lack of
confidence in the legislature:
I also do not agree with the majority that we should simply
presume that government officials are going to do what they say
they will do. Government officials have been saying that they would
remedy the public school system of this state since this court’s
opinion in Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30. Twenty-one years later
we are still faced with the dilemma that our education system is
unconstitutional. Today, however, we have the opportunity to
ensure that another twenty-one years do not pass before a remedy is
60
devised, funded, and implemented.

The lesson of DuPree and Lake View is that a state legislature
cannot be trusted to ensure the proper education of all students. For
twenty-one years, the Arkansas legislature ignored a constitutional
mandate, acknowledging its duty only after decades of effort by an
active judiciary. Nor is Arkansas’s case an isolated one. The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that state’s education funding scheme
61
unconstitutional in 1973. Yet in 1997, that court again reached the
same holding while simultaneously expressing its lack of faith in a

57. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View IV), No. 01-836, 2004 Ark.
LEXIS 425, at *40 (Ark. June 18, 2004) (“[W]e release jurisdiction of this case and the mandate
will issue.”).
58. Id. at *35.
59. Id. at *40–41 (quotation omitted).
60. Id. at *66–67 (Corbin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
61. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973) (“A system of instruction in any
district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional
command.”).
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62
political solution. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Nevada was forced
to enjoin its own legislature after that body unconstitutionally refused
to fund education entirely in order to avoid raising taxes.63 Perhaps
the most egregious example of legislative hostility to educational civil
rights occurred in Alabama. When that state’s supreme court
declared
Alabama’s
education
funding
scheme
to
be
64
unconstitutional, the legislature voted to amend the state
constitution to overturn the court’s decision.65
The Rodriguez Court’s assertion that “fundamental reforms with
respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the
66
legislative process[]” is as naive as it is cruel. Legislatures, by design,
are hostile to minority interests; they cannot be trusted to provide
educational civil rights without the closest supervision from the
courts. By abdicating their responsibility to provide a meaningful
forum to address educational adequacy, the courts ensure this basic
civil right will never be attained.

II. LIABILITY IS NOT ENOUGH:
THE NEED FOR A MEANINGFUL REMEDY
In order for the courts to be a meaningful forum for educational
civil rights cases, they must be able to provide effective remedies. Yet

62.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held:
Our Constitution requires that public school children be given the opportunity to
receive a thorough and efficient education. . . .
....
It is against that backdrop, and the inescapable reality of a continuing profound
constitutional deprivation that has penalized generations of children, that one must
evaluate an alternative, “wait and see” approach. . . . In light of the constitutional
rights at stake, the persistence and depth of the constitutional deprivation, and in the
absence of any real prospect for genuine educational improvement in the most needy
districts, that approach is no longer an option.

Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997).
63. See Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1276 (Nev. 2003) (“The Legislature
must resume its work of funding education and selecting appropriate methods of revenue
generation to balance the state’s budget.”).
64. See Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. Cir.
Ct., Montgomery County, filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624
So. 2d 107, 110–11 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]he system of public schools fails to provide equitable and
adequate educational opportunities to all schoolchildren . . . .”).
65. See ALA. CONST. amend. DLXXXII (“No order of a state court, which requires
disbursement of state funds, shall be binding on the state or any state official until the order has
been approved by a simple majority of both houses of the Legislature.”).
66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
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the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, at the urging of conservative
Presidents, have rolled back important precedents that previously
ensured educational civil rights judgments would be meaningfully
67
enforced. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
the Warren Court held that “[o]nce a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past
68
wrongs is broad . . . .” Fifteen years later, the Reagan administration
published the Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation (“Guidelines”),
which required federal government attorneys to utilize a narrow,
conservative methodology when litigating constitutional cases.69
According to these Reaganic verses, broad equitable relief violates
Article III of the Constitution when it affects people other than “the
70
parties immediately involved in the litigation.” In other words, the
Guidelines encouraged federal attorneys to argue that courts are
powerless to provide certain remedies, even when those remedies are
essential to eliminating a continuing constitutional violation. The
Guidelines’ reasoning was instrumental to a decision three years after
its publication that effectively ended meaningful school
desegregation.71
This Note rejects the reasoning of the Guidelines, and will argue
that the Court was wrong to reject the broad view of equitable relief
captured in Swann. This broad view grew out of the Court’s
frustration with “[d]eliberate resistance” on the part of states subject
72
to desegregation orders. In the seventeen years between Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown I)73 and Swann, the Court learned that
broad equitable remedies were an essential part of breaking the
campaign of “massive resistance” that grew out of opposition to
integration. As this Part argues, the Court was right to adopt such a
viewpoint when the alternative was allowing states to flout the
Constitution. Similarly, the broad view of equity advanced in Swann
is as essential to educational equity as it was to school desegregation.

67.
68.
69.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 15.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION 3 (Feb. 19, 1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (“[G]overnment attorneys should
advance constitutional arguments based only on [the] ‘original meaning.’”).
70. Id. at 118.
71. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding that previously
segregated schools were free to resegregate once a moment of integration was achieved).
72. 402 U.S. at 13.
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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By adopting the conservative stance on equitable relief, the courts
ensure that educational adequacy will always remain a dream
deferred.
A. The Slow Death of Equity
Just one year after its famous decision declaring school
segregation unconstitutional, the Court engaged in an equally famous
74
act of hedging. In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), the
Court decreed that desegregation need only move forward with “all
75
deliberate speed,” and the South was jubilant. One Louisiana state
legislator called Brown II “the mildest decree the Supreme Court
76
possibly could have handed down.” A Florida politician announced
that the Court had “realized it made a mistake in May and is getting
out of it the best way it can.”77 Numerous Southern lawmakers
suggested that desegregation would not be “feasible” for another fifty
78
or one hundred years.
The Brown II decision was motivated far more by politics than
by a belief in constitutional limitations. Far from adopting the ‘vision
of judicial restraint that would later be voiced in the Guidelines,
Brown II expressly acknowledged that courts enjoy “practical
flexibility in shaping . . . [equitable] remedies,” even when such
79
remedies apply broadly. Instead, Brown II was intended largely as a
“peace offering to white southerners,” born of the hope that by
exercising less than its full power, the Court could encourage swifter
desegregation.80
Within months, it became clear that Brown II’s narrow remedy
was a miscalculation.81 “White Citizen’s Councils,” emboldened by
the Court’s cravenness, formed to use all methods short of violence to
resist integration. Several states passed “interposition” resolutions
claiming that Brown I was an “illegal encroachment.”82 Eighty-one
74.
75.
76.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Id. at 301.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 319 (2004).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 349 U.S. at 300.
80. KLARMAN, supra note 76, at 319.
81. See id. at 320 (“That Brown II was a mistake from the Court’s perspective was quickly
apparent.”).
82. Id.
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Southern members of Congress signed a “Southern Manifesto”
pledging “to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this
83
decision.”
In 1955, it was possible for the Justices, in a good faith effort to
desegregate public schools, to stay their hands and hope for voluntary
compliance from the states.84 By the time that Richard Nixon became
president, however, it was readily apparent that Brown II’s remedy
resulted in “entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed.”85
Nevertheless, upon the confirmation of their third and fourth
numbers to the Supreme Court, President Nixon’s Justices began
dismantling the judiciary’s ability to provide meaningful remedies in
educational civil rights cases.
The Nixon Justices’ first attack on Brown I came in the first
86
Milliken v. Bradley. Joined by Justice Stewart, the Nixon four held
that a federal court could not integrate the unconstitutionally
segregated Detroit school district by busing students across statedrawn district lines.87 Moreover, the Court reached this holding
despite the fact that a low minority population in Detroit meant that
cross-district busing was the only available means to desegregate the
Detroit schools.88 In a subsequent proceeding, the Court held that
although actual desegregation was not available as a remedy, a
district court could provide “remedial education programs” to
compensate the victims of discrimination.89 The pre-Brown Court had
a name for this kind of remedy: “separate but equal.”90
Supreme Court hostility to civil rights only grew through the
Reagan and George H.W. Bush presidencies. Perhaps the final nail in
Brown’s coffin came with the Rehnquist Court’s holding in Board of

83. Declaration of Constitutional Principles, supra note 20, at 4460.
84. See KLARMAN, supra note 76, at 320 (“To say that Brown II was misguided is not to say
that the justices calculated foolishly.”).
85. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964).
86. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
87. Id. at 746–47 (“Unless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or
arranged for white students residing in the Detroit District to attend schools in Oakland and
Macomb Counties, they were under no constitutional duty to make provisions for Negro
students to do so.”).
88. See id. at 747 n.22 (“[T]he constitutional principles applicable in school desegregation
cases cannot vary in accordance with the size or population dispersal of the particular city,
county, or school district as compared with neighboring areas.”).
89. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 279 (1977).
90. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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91
Education v. Dowell. The Court in Dowell held that “federal
supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary
measure to remedy past discrimination,”92 and thus a momentarily
93
desegregated district, one which had achieved “unitary status,” was
94
free to recreate segregated neighborhood schools. Moreover, in
reaching this decision, the Court implicitly adopted the Guidelines’
position that once a constitutional “violation is remedied, the court’s
jurisdiction ceases.”95
The effects of this holding have been as disastrous as they were
predictable. On the day Brown I was decided in 1954, only 0.001
percent of African American students in the South attended majority
96
white schools. This percentage increased every year it was measured
until 1991, reaching a peak of 43.5 percent in 1988.97 In the wake of
Dowell-style resegregation, however, this progress is slowly being
lost. The number of Southern black students attending majority white
schools has declined every year since Dowell and is now at its lowest
point since 1970.98
The speed with which resegregation occurs once the courts
abdicate their role in maintaining integration is demonstrated by one
Texas district. Once the Austin Independent School District was
declared unitary in 1983, the federal district court relinquished
jurisdiction in 1986, and the local board redrew attendance zones to

91.
92.
93.
94.

498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 244.
See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 19 (1996) (“A court-supervised district
that has never been declared unitary is obligated under the law to avoid actions that create
segregated and unequal schools. But after a declaration of unitary status, the courts presume
any government action creating racially segregated schools to be innocent . . . .”).
95. GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at 120.
96. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 37 tbl.10 (2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.
harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
97. Id. Although the Supreme Court first allowed a “unitary” district to be resegregated in
1991, the process began five years earlier with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Riddick v. School
Board of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). Riddick was the first federal court case to allow
a school district, once declared unitary, to return to segregated neighborhood schools. See id. at
535 (“[O]nce the goal of a unitary school system is achieved, the district court’s role ends.”);
ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 94, at xxiii (explaining that Riddick was the first federal case to
allow a unitary school district to dismantle its desegregation plan).
98. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 96, at 37 tbl.10.
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99
create segregated neighborhood schools. In 1991, almost one-third
of the elementary schools had minority (nonwhite) enrollments of
more than 80 percent, even though a majority of the district’s students
100
were not minorities. When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, the
court was obliged to follow Dowell,101 even though the student
reassignments created the segregation in fourteen of the nineteen
102
imbalanced schools. In a special concurrence, Judge John Minor
Wisdom opined that the disparities between white and minority
schools were so great that they would be unconstitutional even under
Plessy v. Ferguson.103
Professor Jack Balkin has observed that “[i]t is often said that no
theory of constitutional interpretation is sound if it cannot explain
104
and justify Brown v. Board of Education,” and yet the Supreme
Court has constructively overturned this iconic decision, allowing
schools to resegregate after only a moment of integration. As the
Austin example demonstrates, elected school boards and state
legislatures cannot be trusted to maintain Brown’s legacy. Integration
must come from meaningful judicial remedies, or it will not come at
all.

B. What Should Have Been Done
One purpose of the Constitution is to “withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.”105 Accordingly, when a state
flouts its proper role, routinely abridging the constitutionally granted
rights of its citizens, the courts must enjoy broad latitude in restoring
these rights.106 As both the battle over desegregation and the state of
Arkansas’s struggle with educational civil rights demonstrate, the
courts cannot be shy in exercising this power. The Arkansas

99. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 94, at 20.
100. Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1322 (5th Cir. 1991) (Wisdom, J.,
specially concurring).
101. Id. at 1313–14.
102. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 94, at 20.
103. Price, 945 F.2d at 1322 (Wisdom, J., specially concurring).
104. JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID x–xi
(2001).
105. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
106. See infra Part III (describing the courts’ power to impose affirmative duties upon states
violating the Constitution).
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legislature ignored its constitutional duties for over twenty years, only
reluctantly taking action when a firm deadline was imposed by the
107
courts. Regrettably, the United States Supreme Court was equally
slow to learn the importance of swift and certain judicial action.
When the Court displayed its tragic “lack of firm resolve” in
108
Brown II, Southern resistance to desegregation was “inevitable”
109
and came in the form of disingenuous “freedom-of-choice plans” —
efforts by states to “interpose” their own authority against that of the
110
Constitution —and, of course, famous resistance from Southern
governors like George Wallace and Orval Faubus.111 Although the
Court eventually reversed course, declaring, sixteen years after
Brown I, that courts may take “affirmative action . . . to achieve truly
nondiscriminatory assignments,”112 by then it was too late. Richard
Nixon was already president; the Court had squandered its liberal
113
majority, and it has yet to regain its historic concern for civil rights.

107. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text (chronicling the Arkansas legislature’s
defiance of a court order).
108. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 124 (2004); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1604 (“One must ask whether it would have made a difference
had the Supreme Court in Brown II, or [in] a case soon thereafter, imposed timetables and
detailed remedies for desegregation.”).
109. See OGLETREE, supra note 108, at 125 (“[F]reedom-of-choice plans emerged as the
most common response to Brown. These plans repeatedly failed to yield any significant
desegregation.”). Freedom-of-choice plans allowed black children to choose to attend
historically white schools, but did not mandate integration. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp.
776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam) (upholding South Carolina’s freedom-of-choice plan).
Shortly after Brown, many federal district courts engaged in tenuous legal arguments to justify
their constitutionality. See, e.g., id. (“[N]o violation of the Constitution is involved even though
the children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different
churches.”). These plans were eventually declared unconstitutional where they failed to
effectively bring about integration. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968)
(“‘Freedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitutionally required
end . . . . If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other
means must be used to achieve this end.’” (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326,
333 (4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring) (footnote omitted))).
110. See OGLETREE, supra note 108, at 130 (describing the Southern interposition
movement, which claimed that states had the authority to protect their citizens from unjust
actions by the federal government).
111. See id. at 128–29 (describing the two governors’ use of segregation as the focal point of
their election strategy). As Professor Ogletree explains, both Wallace and Faubus “began as
moderates on race issues, but later found that the key to success lay in vehemently opposing
integration.” Id. at 128. When Wallace lost his 1960 bid for the Democratic gubernatorial
nomination in Alabama, he famously “declared that he would never be ‘outniggered’ again.” Id.
112. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
113. See Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1601 (“Four Justices appointed by President
Richard Nixon are largely to blame for the decisions of the 1970s . . . .”).
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In the field of public education, the doctrine of judicial restraint
has no place. The courts can depend neither on the goodwill of
114
legislatures nor on the integrity of their own membership in the face
of appointees hostile to civil rights. Furthermore, if education truly is
the “principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
115
adjust normally to his environment,” then each minute that children
are denied their right to an adequate education can only drive them
deeper into a hole from which they may never recover. A responsible
court cannot gamble with these lives. It must demand timely action
through rigid deadlines backed by injunctions.116 Doing otherwise will
ensure its decisions will never be meaningfully enforced.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND
AFFIRMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Having taken a stance against what conservatives call “judicial
restraint”—deferring to the legislative branches even when such
deference encourages states to defy the Constitution—this Note
proposes an alternative method of constitutional interpretation and
demonstrates how that method could be used to provide the
educational civil rights denied in Rodriguez. As the majority of this
Note has focused on philosophical questions about the proper role of
courts, it is tempting to view the remaining three Parts as little more
than an afterthought. This structure is intentional, however, because
it is necessary to call attention to just how broad an impact the
Court’s institutional competency jurisprudence has on Americans
unable to seek redress through the political process. The contraction
of educational civil rights is merely a symptom of a larger disease, and
so this Part will focus on curing this greater malady.
It is hardly a revolutionary idea that the Constitution places an
affirmative duty on the states to act in accordance with its mandates.117

114. See supra notes 42–65 and accompanying text.
115. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
116. See Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1620 (suggesting that if the Court had provided
more aggressive remedies in the years between Brown and Swann, desegregation might have
occurred more quickly).
117. Cf. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (“School boards such as the
respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”).
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Nor is it particularly radical to claim that the courts have an
118
affirmative duty to ensure that this mandate is met. Yet the
dominant conservative view of the Constitution is that the courts
should defer to branches that are structurally incapable of providing
certain rights, or worse, that courts should hear a case, find a
constitutional violation, but refuse to remedy the violation.119 Such a
proposition is, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “too
120
extravagant to be maintained.”
Nevertheless, it is one thing to argue that the courts have a duty
121
to hear pleas for redress of grievances, and another thing altogether
to suggest that a particular right—for example, the right to an
adequate education—is among those protected by the Constitution.
This Part attempts to build a progressive constitutional framework
from which such a right can emerge. Like the first two Parts of this
Note, this framework’s methodology is rooted in the notion that the
Constitution cannot be read both to grant a right and to deny the very
tools which give that right meaning. Accordingly, this Part argues that
when a new right becomes essential to the maintenance of a
preexisting constitutional right, that new right must also be protected
by the Constitution, even if this imposes an affirmative duty on the
states.
Although the Court has yet to embrace this methodology fully, it
has been used in several constitutional cases. In Gideon v.
122
for example, the Supreme Court recognized an
Wainwright,
affirmative constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent
123
criminal defendants in state cases. The Court recognized that
“‘[assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights

118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
arising under this Constitution . . . .”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.”).
119. See supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text (explaining that Court’s refusal to grant
meaningful remedies in the Bradley and Dowell cases).
120. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179.
121. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (arguing that the courts should remain
active in areas that cannot be effectively governed by the other branches).
122. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
123. See id. at 344 (holding that a fair trial cannot be achieved “if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him”).
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124
of life and liberty’”; accordingly, a mere right to be free from
interference in seeking assistance from counsel was held insufficient
to preserve the rights of the poor.125
Criminal defendants enjoy numerous affirmative rights under the
Gideon principle. In Ake v. Oklahoma,126 the Court extended Gideon
to include a right to state-funded psychiatric assistance for indigent
127
defendants invoking an insanity defense. In so holding, the Court
reaffirmed its commitment to imposing affirmative duties on the
states when such duties are necessary to preserve constitutional
rights. “[W]hen a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent
defendant in a criminal proceeding,” wrote Justice Marshall for the
Court, “it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair
opportunity to present his defense.”128 Similarly, in Miranda v.
Arizona,129 the Court held that because “the threshold requirement
130
for an intelligent decision as to [a right’s] exercise” is knowledge of
the right’s very existence, states have an affirmative duty to inform
criminal defendants of their rights while in custody.131
Affirmative constitutional rights are not limited to the criminal
context. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics,132 the Court held that there is an affirmative right to sue
federal officers for violations of constitutional rights.133 In a famous
concurrence, Justice Harlan highlighted the necessity of such an

124. Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
125. Id. at 344.
126. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
127. See id. at 74 (“[W]hen a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at
the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a
State provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise
afford one.”).
128. Id. at 76.
129. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
130. Id. at 468.
131. Id. at 467–74. Admittedly, the constitutional status of Miranda has fluctuated. In
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court held that Miranda warnings “were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” but rather were designed “to provide practical
reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.” Id. at 444. In Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), however, the Court reaffirmed that Miranda was
“constitutionally based.” Id. at 440.
132. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
133. Id. at 391–92; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980) (holding a right to
sue to be implicit in the Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979)
(holding a similar right to sue to be implicit in the Fifth Amendment).

032006 05_MILLHISER.DOC

428

4/24/2006 12:29 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

affirmative right to
constitutional rights:

the

vindication

of

[Vol. 55:405
Bivens’

preexisting

Putting aside the desirability of leaving the problem of federal
official liability to the vagaries of common-law actions, it is apparent
that some form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone
in Bivens’ alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in which an
individual in Bivens’ position will be able to obviate the harm by
securing injunctive relief from any court. However desirable a direct
remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for
individual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to
suit. Finally, assuming Bivens innocence of the crime charged, the
“exclusionary rule” is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens’ shoes,
134
it is damages or nothing.

Although conservative appointments have led to broad exceptions to
the Bivens doctrine, these exceptions only highlight the Supreme
Court’s insistence that an affirmative constitutional right arises when
such a right is necessary to the preservation of other preexisting
constitutional rights. In Bush v. Lucas,135 the Court denied a Bivens
suit to a government employee who was demoted after speaking out
136
against his employer. Because Congress had already provided a
regulatory scheme allowing federal employees to seek relief, an
137
additional right to sue was not deemed necessary. Similarly, in
138
Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court denied a Bivens remedy to
plaintiffs who had been unconstitutionally denied their Social
Security benefits because the Social Security Act provided an
administrative remedy.139 In both cases, the Court did not hold that a
right to sue in federal court was guaranteed because it did not view
such a right as necessary to the vindication of preexisting
constitutional rights.

134. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409–10 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
136. Id. at 368, 370.
137. See id. at 388 (“The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong
that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system . . . should be
augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.”).
138. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
139. See id. at 424–29 (“Congress is . . . charged with making the inevitable compromises
required in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program. Congress has
discharged that responsibility to the extent that it affects the case before us, and we see no legal
basis that would allow us to revise its decision.” (citation omitted)).
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Perhaps the most famous example of the Court’s imposing an
affirmative duty on a state to preserve a preexisting constitutional
right is itself an educational civil rights decision. In Green v. County
140
School Board, the Court, frustrated by Southern refusal to obey its
decision in Brown I, declared that local school boards were “clearly
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch.”141 Shortly thereafter, the Court
gave sharp teeth to this assertion, upholding, in Swann v. Charlotte142
Mecklenburg Board of Education, a district court’s imposition of
several highly restrictive affirmative duties on the school board,
including mandatory busing to achieve integration.143
Significantly, the textual basis for the new right in each of these
cases is the same as that of the preexisting right. Thus, the affirmative
right to counsel in Gideon stems from the Sixth Amendment, and the
right to integration through mandatory busing stems from the Equal
Protection Clause. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services,144 however, the Court held that the purpose of the
Due Process Clause “was to protect the people from the State, not to
ensure that the State protected them from each other.”145 The Court’s
holding stems from the belief that “[t]he Framers were content to
leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the
democratic political processes.”146 It is tempting to read DeShaney as
precluding new rights from being found implicit in preexisting due
process rights, but the DeShaney opinion also admitted that “in
certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State
140. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
141. Id. at 437–38.
142. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
143. See id. at 29–31 (1971) (upholding mandatory busing of white students to traditionally
black schools and black students to traditionally white schools).
144. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
145. Id. at 196.
146. Id. Professor Steven Heyman, in an article published shortly after the Court’s decision
in DeShaney, argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist mischaracterized history in asserting that
affirmative rights are inconsistent with the Framers’ intent. See Steven J. Heyman, The First
Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509
(1992) (“[T]he congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment show that establishing a
federal constitutional right to protection was one of the central purposes of the Amendment.”);
see also Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 113 (1987) (statement
of Judge Bork) (“Any judge who thought today he would go back to the original intent really
ought to be accompanied by a guardian rather than be sitting on a bench.”).
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affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular
147
individuals.” “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment,” for example, “requires the State to provide
148
adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners.” Similarly, the
“Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the State to
provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such services as
are necessary to ensure their ‘reasonable safety’ from themselves and
others.”149
DeShaney is not a good case for proponents of meaningful access
to education, but these exceptions suggest that even the conservative
Rehnquist Court was reluctant to discard the notion of constitutional
necessity. The Court’s opinion explained that the exceptions to
DeShaney were necessary “because the prisoner is unable by reason
of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself, [so] it is only just
150
that the State be required to care for him.” Once again, the state
assumes an affirmative constitutional duty necessary to preserve a
preexisting constitutional right—when a state deprives incarcerated
individuals of the ability to meet their own basic needs, it is required
by the Eighth Amendment to ensure that those needs are met.
IV. EDUCATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE
Although state legislatures may, under some circumstances, limit
the franchise to certain individuals, once the franchise has been
granted, it may not be diluted with respect to an eligible voter.151 In
other words, under the right circumstances, a state legislature can
152
deny the vote entirely, but, once granted, the right to vote must

147. 489 U.S. at 198.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 199.
150. Id. (quotations omitted).
151. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“When the state legislature vests the right to
vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental;
and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the
equal dignity owed to each voter.”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)
(“[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise.”).
152. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (allowing a state to
disenfranchise convicted felons); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
53–54 (1959) (allowing a state to disenfranchise individuals who fail a literacy test).
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remain intact. In this sense, the fundamental right to vote is unusual.
153
This Part argues that an affirmative right to an adequate education
is essential to preserving an intact right to vote. Furthermore, because
a state’s right to deny the franchise based on a literacy test or device
has been stripped by federal statute,154 the only remaining option is
for states to provide an education adequate to allow voters to exercise
their franchise effectively.
The idea of an essential link between education and voting is
hardly a new one. President James Madison argued that “a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
155
power which knowledge gives.” Senator Horace Mann, whom
Justice Frankfurter credited as one of the fathers of the modern,
156
secular, public school, echoed Madison’s sentiment: “[I]t seems
clear that the minimum of this education can never be less than such
as is sufficient to qualify each citizen for the civil and social duties he
will be called to discharge;—such an education . . . is necessary for the
voter in municipal affairs . . . .”157 Senator Mann designed the
Massachusetts compulsory school system to match his understanding
that “schooling was necessary to preserve republican institutions and
to create a political community.”158 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself
has acknowledged this necessary connection between education and
159
democracy. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court recognized, “as
Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history, that some degree
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve

153. An “adequate education” as used here is defined as an education which provides those
skills necessary to the intelligent exercise of the franchise. Part V, infra, provides a methodology
for determining which skills fit this criteria.
154. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa(a) (2000) (“No citizen shall be denied,
because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State,
or local election conducted in any State or political subdivision of a State.”).
155. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
156. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (describing the birth of the secular public school and Horace Mann’s role in its
inception).
157. HORACE MANN, THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE
EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 63 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., Teachers Coll. Press 1957) (1846).
158. Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices
of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174 (1996).
159. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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160
freedom and independence.” And yet, the Court has never met its
own mandate to ensure that this elusive “degree of education” is
provided.
The Rodriguez plaintiffs argued that “a voter cannot cast his
ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.”161 The plaintiffs’ argument
correctly rested on the notion that voting is not merely juggling levers
in a booth, but rather involves making an intelligent connection
between the votes cast and the voter’s goals in advancing a particular
form of government. The American political system “was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people,”162 but if voters do
not understand what they are voting for, they will be ill-equipped to
engage in such interchange. Like all constitutional rights, the right to
vote cannot be interpreted as a mere formality. Being allowed to cast
a ballot is not enough; voters must be able to understand just what it
is they are voting for. Accordingly, an adequate education is one that
prepares the incipient voter to navigate effectively the ocean of
magazines, newspapers, and television programs upon which all
modern voters depend for information.163
Ironically, some of the best judicial support for this view of the
right to vote stems from a decision upholding the right of states to

160. Id. at 221.
161. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
162. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
163. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959) (arguing
that the ability to understand “newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter” may
be essential to exercising the franchise). A recent University of Maryland study highlights the
crucial import of training voters to select from the cacophony of news sources. See STEVEN
KULL ET AL., PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES, MISPERCEPTIONS, THE
MEDIA AND THE IRAQ WAR 7, 12–20 (2003), http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/
Media_10_02_03_Report.pdf (2003). The Kull study asked respondents whether they believed
in the veracity of three false statements: (1) “Evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have
been found”; (2) “Weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq”; and (3) “World
public opinion favored the US going to war with Iraq.” Id. at 7. Although only 23 percent of
persons who were primarily informed by PBS or NPR believed one or more of the (incorrect)
statements, 55 percent of CNN and NBC watchers were victims of misinformation, and 80
percent of FOX News viewers were misinformed regarding the Iraq war. Id. at 13. These
misperceptions had a strong correlation with respondents’ political preference. Although
supporters of President Bush had a 45 percent chance of believing each of the false statements,
supporters of the Democrats had only a 17 percent chance of believing each false statement. Id.
at 18. This data suggests that some news sources better inform their consumers than others, and
that those consumers must possess a baseline of knowledge to distinguish between good, bad
and intentionally misleading journalism.
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deny the franchise. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
164
Elections, the Supreme Court upheld a state law that required
voters to pass a literacy test. In doing so, the Court held that because
of the role that “newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed
matter” play in educating voters, it was reasonable to conclude that
“only those who [were] literate should exercise the franchise.”165
Lassiter was overturned by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
forbids states from restricting the franchise on the basis of a literacy
or other test,166 but that does not mean that Lassiter was a decision
without any wisdom whatsoever. Literacy and similar skills are
essential to meaningful exercise of the franchise, and a meaningful
right to vote must encompass a meaningful right to education.
In Reynolds v. Sims,167 the Supreme Court made the seemingly
obvious point that “[i]t would appear extraordinary to suggest that a
State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that
certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote
only once.”168 Yet this vote inflation is effectively what states engage
in by providing a superior education to some districts, while denying
that opportunity to others. As poorly-educated voters are
substantially less likely to vote than well-educated voters,169 denying
an adequate education to some school districts while providing one to
others ensures that certain voters will be constructively
disenfranchised for no other reason than geography. Even worse,
without an adequate education, those who do cast a ballot often will
not understand just what they are voting for.
V. THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE
EDUCATION
So far, this Note has found little wisdom in Rodriguez, but
Justice Powell’s majority opinion does make one fair critique of a
fundamental right to an adequate education: “Even if it were
conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

360 U.S. 45 (1959).
Id. at 52.
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa(a) (2000).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 562.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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[preexisting constitutional rights], we have no indication that the
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an
170
education that falls short.” It is not unreasonable for the Court to
171
ask, “Why literacy and not golf?” Accordingly, if Rodriguez-style
plaintiffs are to be successful at the federal level, they must be able to
define just what skills are required to be taught under the
Constitution. Fortunately, the fifty states have already made this
determination.
Justice Brandeis famously wrote that “[i]t is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
172
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” The
purpose of this laboratory, however, is not to engage in a mindless
exercise of federalism for its own sake, but instead to weigh various
methods against one another as part of a quest for the ideal. The
“laboratory of the states” is how American policymakers separate the
wheat from the chaff, and when consensus emerges among the several
states to scrap one policy in favor of another, such consensus should
not be lightly ignored.173 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
correctly deferred to this consensus, acknowledging it three times in
the last four terms. In striking down antisodomy laws in Lawrence v.
Texas,174 the Court noted that “[o]ver the course of the last decades,
States with same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing
175
Similarly, in Atkins v. Virginia,176 the Court forbade
them.”
executions of the mentally retarded largely because of the growing

170. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973).
171. This question was originally posed as, “Why education and not golf?” in Professor
Frank Michelman’s seminal article on the Constitution and the poor. Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 59 (1969).
172. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173. Professor Cass Sunstein argues that the very purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
prevent radical actions by single states:
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though not
exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run departures. The clause
has therefore been associated with a particular conception of judicial review, one that
sees the courts as safeguards against novel developments brought about by temporary
majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.
Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
174. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
175. Id. at 570.
176. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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consensus among the states that such executions were intolerable.
The Court used the same reasoning to invalidate executions of
juveniles just three years later.178
A similar deference is called for in defining the scope of a
constitutional right to an adequate education. Under the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001, each state receiving federal education grants
must establish statewide standards179 and assessments180 for math,
reading, and the language arts. Unsurprisingly, the states generally
agree as to which skills should be included in these mandatory
standards and assessments. When a particular skill is required by all
fifty states, such consensus should be highly persuasive to a federal
court that this skill is necessary to achieving an adequate education.
Accordingly, the best starting point for determining the scope of a
fundamental right to education is the states themselves.
Providing even the most disadvantaged children with an
adequate education is not only constitutionally mandated but also
wholly attainable. Several models already exist that prove that any
child can learn, given the right school environment.181 The lesson of

177. See id. at 315–16 (“[T]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons . . . provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”).
178. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (“A majority of States have rejected
the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is
required by the Eighth Amendment.”). Admittedly, Roper and Atkins provide less support for
the argument that the Court should seek guidance from the states in educational civil rights
cases than does Lawrence because the Eighth Amendment has long been interpreted to
consider “‘evolving standards of decency.’” Id. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100–01 (1985)).
179. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(C) (Supp. I 2001) (“The State shall have . . . academic
standards for all public elementary school and secondary school children . . . [and such
standards] shall include the . . . knowledge, skills, and levels of achievement expected of all
children.”).
180. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(A) (“Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State has
developed and is implementing a single, statewide State accountability system . . . .”). Statewide
standards and assessments were common in many states long before No Child Left Behind
became law. See Jennifer R. Rowe, High School Exit Exams Meet IDEA—An Examination of
the History, Legal Ramifications, and Implications for Local School Administrators and
Teachers, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 75, 89–95 (chronicling the history of high school exit exams
from the 1970s to the present).
181. See Jaime Escalante & Jack Dirmann, The Jaime Escalante Math Program, 59 J. OF
NEGRO EDUC. 407, 407–08 (1990) (explaining the success of the “Escalante Math Program,”
which teaches calculus to nearly two hundred inner city students each year); Peter H. Gibbon, A
Teacher’s Tough Model, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A23 (“[The teacher] . . . . moved to
Hobart Elementary School in Los Angeles to teach students who lived in poor neighborhoods
and knew little English. . . . His students read ‘The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn’ and The
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these successful models, however, is that such achievement among
disadvantaged students only comes through extra effort on the part of
the school. It is not enough, as the Rodriguez plaintiffs did, to
demand equality of resources to each district and expect all children
to receive an adequate education. If the educational adequacy
mandated by the Constitution is ever to become a reality, it will only
be achieved by providing disadvantaged youth with additional
resources, superior instruction, and above all additional instruction
time. This is the model used by highly successful programs such as
KIPP, the Escalante Math Program, and the Hobart
Shakespearians,182 and it is the model states must adopt to meet their
constitutional obligations to underprivileged youth.
CONCLUSION
Justice Thurgood Marshall understood that educational civil
rights can only be granted by an active judiciary. Years of right-wing
appointments, however, have buried this understanding under a pile
of “Impeach Earl Warren” bumper stickers. It would be naive to
think that civil rights of any kind will experience a renaissance as long
as conservative presidents continue to push the Court further to the
right, but this does not mean that progressives should ignore their
duty to provide an alternative vision of the law. When conservatives
were dissatisfied with desegregation orders and other cases that
expansively interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, they responded
with a comprehensive vision for a right-wing Constitution—the very
vision captured by the Reagan-era Guidelines.183 This narrow vision
can be defeated, but it can only be defeated by demanding
meaningful rights instead of empty formalism.

Crucible. They play Vivaldi, perform King Lear and outperform other students on standardized
tests.”); Lynn Rosellini, Getting Young Lives in Line, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 2004,
at 87 (“Most KIPP students are poor and enter with reading and math skills well below grade
level. Yet the schools have consistently taken disadvantaged children and dramatically boosted
their academic achievement.”).
182. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 69–71 (describing the Guidelines’ view of equitable relief).

